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CASE COMMENTS
CASE COMMENTS
Constitutional Law-Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility
Statutes--Necessity for a Hearing on Liability
Georgia's motor vehicle safety responsibility statute provided
that both the vehicle registration and the driver's license of any
uninsured motorist involved in an accident would be suspended unless
he posted security to cover the amount of the damages claimed by
the aggrieved parties.' Although an administrative hearing was
provided for,2 fault or liability were completely irrelevant factors to
the suspension process.
Bell was a clergymen whose ministry required him to travel
by car in the rural communities of Georgia. In 1968, he was in-
volved in an accident in which a five year old girl rode her bicycle
into the side of his car. The girl's parents filed an accident report
with the Director of the Georgia Department of Public Safety in-
dicating that their daughter had suffered injuries for which they
claimed $5,000 in damages. The director then informed Bell, who
was uninsured, that a bond or security cash deposit in the amount of
$5,000 would be required or his license would be suspended. Bell's
proffer of evidence that the accident was unavoidable was rejected
and he was given thirty days to comply with the security require-
ment.
Bell appealed de novo in the Superior Court of Georgia where
it was determined that since he was not at fault his license should not
be suspended. The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed, holding that
fault or innocence were completely irrelevant factors.3 The Georgia
Supreme Court denied review and Bell applied to the United States
Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. Held: reversed. The Supreme
Court held that since the whole statutory scheme was implicitly based
upon fault, it was a violation of procedural due process not to hold
a hearing prior to the suspension of the license in order to deter-
mine whether there was a "reasonable possibility" that a judgment
in the amount claimed would be rendered against the licensee. Bell
v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).'
1 GA. CoDE ANN. § 92A-605 (1958).
2 GA. CODE ANN. § 92A-602 (1958).
121 Ga. App. 418, 174 S.E.2d 235 (1970).
4 Note that proof of future financial responsibility was not at issue.
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The Bell v. Burson decision represents an application of due
process requirements in the area of administrative hearings. More
importantly, Bell clearly seems to invalidate a large portion of the
West Virginia Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Law5 and in
so doing, necessitates immediate legislative action.
Financial responsibility statutes are common enactments in
the majority of states and have as their aim the protection of the
public against the operation of motor vehicles by financially irrespon-
sible persons.6 West Virginia's statute' has as its purpose the pro-
tection of the public against the operation of motor vehicles by
"reckless and irresponsible persons."8
West Virginia's Safety Responsibility Law9 is quite similar to
that of Georgia's.'0 In West Virginia, any driver or owner of any
vehicle subject to the registration laws of this state, which is involved
in an accident causing bodily injury, death, or property damage
exceeding $100 must file an accident report." Unless the driver or
owner falls within the statutory exemptions,' 2 he must post security
in the amount prescribed by the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles."
Failure to deposit the security within the time specified by the
commissioner results in the suspension of the party's license.' 4
Both Georgia and West Virginia have provisions for hearings
upon the request of the aggrieved persons. 5 In Georgia, the ad-
ministrative hearing excluded consideration of the motorist's fault
or liability for the accident. The West Virginia provision likewise
accords no latitude to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles to con-
5 W. VA. CoDE ch. 171), art. 1-3 (Michie 1966).6 Hadden v. Aitken, 156 Neb. 215, 55 N.W.2d 620 (1952); Annot., 35
A.L.R.2d 1003 (1954).7 W. VA. CODE ch. 17D, art. 1-3 (Michie 1966).
8 Adkins v. Inland Mut. Ins. Co., 124 W. Va. 388, 20 S.E.2d 471 (1942);
Nulter v. State Rd. Comm'n, 119 W. Va. 312, 193 S.E. 549 (1937).
9 W. VA. CODE ch. 17D, art. 1-3 (Michie 1966).
"0 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 92A-601 et seq. (1958).
11 W. VA. CODE ch. 17D, art. 3, § 1 (Michie 1966).
' 21d. §§ 4 and 6; Security and suspension requirements shall not apply
(a) to a driver or owner covered by an automobile liability policy or bond;
(b) to a qualified self-insurer [see 17D-6-2J; (c) to a person under the jurisdic-
tion of the public service commission who has qualified as a self-insurer; (d) to
a single vehicle accident; (e) to a legally parked vehicle; (f) to the owner of a
vehicle whose vehicle was being operated without his permission, express or
implied.
13 1d. § 2.
1
4 1d. § 3.
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sider fault, but requires him simply to carry out his statutory duties.' 6
In any event this provision for a hearing was rarely used in West
Virginia.1
West Virginia's former Safety Responsibility Law,"8 which was
superseded by the current statute, was held constitutional in the
case of Nulter v. State Road Commission.9 There, the West Vir-
ginia court said that "notice and hearing-a day in court-are
matters of right in judicial proceedings; but not so, necessarily, in
administrative proceedings."" The court asserted that the operation
of a motor vehicle was not a natural right but "merely a conditional
privilege which may be suspended or revoked under the police
power, even without a notice or an opportunity. to be heard."2
These statements articulated in the Nulter case seem to have
been overruled by the decision in Bell v. Burson. In deciding
that the suspension of a license without the benefit of a hearing on
fault was a denial of procedural due process, the Supreme Court
said:
Once licenses are issued, as in petitioner's case, their
continued possession may become essential in the pursuit of
a livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus involves
state action that adjudicates important interests of the
licensees. In such cases the licenses are not to be taken
away without that procedural due process required by the
Fourteenth amendment.22
1 W. VA. CoDE ch. 17D, art. 2, § 1 (Michie 1966) provides:
The commissioner shall administer and enforce the provisions of
this chapter and shall make rules and regulations necessary for its
administration, including provisions for hearings by the commissioner
or his representative upon the request of persons aggrieved by any
orders or acts by the commissioner, but the granting of any such
hearings shall not operate to prevent or delay any action by the
commissioner which is mandatory under the provisions of this
Chapter. (emphasis added)
17 To the best knowledge of the Director of Safety Responsibility only
one request has ever been made for a hearing, and this was dropped when the
motorist learned that fault would not be considered at the hearing. Interview
with R.R. Bolen, Director of Safety Responsibility Division, Department of
Motor Vehicles, in Charleston, August 2, 1971.
18 Acts of the 42d Leg. ch. 61, Reg. Sess. (1935).
19 119 W. Va. 312, 193 S.E. 549 (1937).
20 Id. at 316, 193 S.E. at 551.
21 Id.. at 317, 193 S.E. at 552.
22 402 U.S. at 539 (1971).
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Furthermore, the court declared that constitutional restraints limit
state power to terminate an entitlement whether the entitlement is
denominated a "right" or a "privilege."2 3
The Bell decision had immediate ramifications in West Virginia
because of the large number of license suspensions of uninsured
motorists each year.14 The office of the Attorney General of West
Virginia in an interdepartmental letter stated that the current West
Virginia law does not give sufficient latitude to the commissioner
to hold the type of hearing envisioned by the Bell case.2" The result
has been that all license suspensions of uninsured motorists who
cannot post security have been halted, pending legislative clarifac-
tion.26 The only licenses currently being suspended under the West
Virginia statute since the Bell decision are those of persons adjudged
liable in a court of law." The West Virginia Department of Motor
Vehicles has given the decision retroactive effect and is in the pro-
cess of returning previously suspended licenses upon the request of
the licensee." Also security held in deposit under the statute is
being returned." However, the public's response to this offer by the
state has been minimal."
Although the Department of Motor Vehicles has complied, to
the extent of its powers, with the holding in the Bell case, the result
has essentially been a de facto abolition of the Safety Responsibility
Law in this state. Until the West Virginia Legislature enacts a law
in compliance with Bell, there will be no Safety Responsibility Law
for all practical purposes.
2 3 Id. at 539; see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (withdrawal
of welfare benefits); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (disqualification
from unemployment compensation); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958)
(denial of a tax exemption); Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Ed., 350 U.S. 551
(1956) (discharge from public employment).
The idea that due process was required when a "right" was involved but
not necessarily so when a "privilege" was being adjudicated has been rejected
in Bell v. Burson and in the cases noted supra.
24 There were 23,895 suspensions of privileges issued in accident cases
in fiscal year 1969-70 and 16,722 in fiscal year 1968-69. West Virginia
Department of Motor Vehicles Annual Report (July 1, 1969-June 30, 1970).
25 Letter from William F. Carroll, Assistant Attorney General, to
Homer R. Shields, Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, June 3, 1971.26 Interview with R.R. Bolen, Director of Safety Responsibility Division,
Department of Motor Vehicles, in Charleston, August 2, 1971.27 1d.
28 Id.
29 Id.
1o Charleston Daily Mail, August 12, 1971, at 1 col. 6. As of August 12,
1971, only about 3,000 out of possibly 20,000 to 30,000 affected persons
had contacted the Department of Motor Vehicles.
[Vol. 74
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The Legislature could adopt any one of the alternatives offered
by the Supreme Court." The Court suggested that the liability issue
could be heard at a present hearing. This is not possible in West
Virginia.32 Or the hearing could be held in the de novo proceeding
provided for under Georgia's law. This remedy, however, is not
present in West Virginia.3"
A third suggestion is to withhold the suspension until there is
an adjudication of liability in an action for damages brought by the
injured party. This alternative seems to obviate the very purpose
of a Safety Responsibility Law. It is quite possible that no action will
ever be brought by the injured party or that the irresponsible driver
will be involved in another accident before any such adjudication
takes place. On the other end of the spectrum, the Court suggested
that Georgia [or West Virginia] could completely abandon its
present scheme and adopt one of the various alternatives in force in
other states. 4 Finally, all of the above could be rejected and some
entirely new regulatory scheme could be devised.
The West Virginia Legislature must either change our law to
comply with the hearing requirements of Bell or alter our current
regulatory scheme in areas other than just the Safety Responsibility
Law. The simplest method would be to enact a statute providing
for a hearing on the issue of fault prior to the suspension of the
license.
However, there are attendant legal problems in that approach.
The court in Bell stated that the hearing need not be a full adjudica-
tion of the question of liability but rather one in which it is deter-
mined whether there exists a "reasonable possibility" that a judgment
will be rendered against the licensee."5 The hearing must be "mean-
ingful" and "appropriate to the nature of the case ""'6
But questions immediately arise as to whether other due process
safeguards will be extended to this preliminary administrative hear-
31 402 U.S. at 542 (1971).
32 W. VA. CODE ch. 17D, art. 2, § 1 (Michie 1966). The wording of
the West Virginia statute prohibits the hearing from interfering with the
requirements for security following an accident.
"But, judicial review of contested administrative cases is provided for
in W. VA. CODE ch. 29A, art. 5, § 4 (Michie 1966).
34 The various alternatives include compulsory insurance plans, public
or joint public-private unsatisfied judgment funds, and assigned claims plans.
See R. KEETON & J. O'CoNNELL, AFTER CARS CRASH (1967).
35402 U.S. at 540 (1971).
.6 Id. at 542.
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ing?3" Will the licensee be allowed representation by counsel?3" Will
witnesses be present?39 Will the hearings be retroactive to the licenses
now under suspension?4' Another anciliary problem is raised by
those persons who, under the threat of suspension of their licenses,
agreed under an unconstitutional statute to pay indemnity agree-
ments.4'
The Bell v. Burson decision has already significantly affected
West Virginia's Safety Responsibility Law. However, the full effect
of the decision will not be realized until the West Virginia Legislature
acts. The decision will either force West Virginia to comply with
3 In a related situation in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), where
a hearing was required prior to termination of welfare benefits, the court
particularized the essential elements of procedural due process as being (a)
timely and adequate notice of the reasons for termination; (b) an effective
opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse witness with oral arguments
and evidence; (c) disclosure of the evidence used to prove the state's case;
(d) the right to be heard by counsel retained by the recipient; (e) a decision
resting solely on the legal rules and evidence brought forth at the hearing; and
(f) an impartial decision maker. Not required were: (a) a complete record or
comprehensive opinion; (b) a particular order of proof or mode of offering
evidence; (c) absence of prior involvement in some aspects of the case by
the decision maker; and (d) counsel provided for the recipient by the welfare
agency. See 73 W. VA. L. REv. 80, 87 (1971).
38 In civil cases and administrative proceedings, due process requirements
are generally held to be satisfied by according the individual a right to
counsel at his own expense. 73 W. VA. L. REv. 80, 88 (1971).
19 See note 37, supra.
40 Charleston Daily Mail, August 12, 1971, at 1, col. 6. If the Legisla-
ture decides to provide for a hearing and makes it retroactive to June 6, 1971,
the department would start out with a hearing backlog of about 45,000 ac-
cidents.
41 Following an accident involving property damage over $100 or personal
injuries, form MV-100-SR was mailed to the licensee by the Department of
Motor Vehicles. In order to prevent the suspension of his license, form MV-
100-SR provided the licensee had to furnish one of the following:
(a) proof of an automobile liability policy, or; (b) cash, certified check or
negotiable instrument in the amount stipulated by the commissioner to serve as
security, or; (c) a notorized release for damages from all persons injured
and from all persons whose property was damaged in excess of $100, or;
(d) a transcript showing that the licensee was found not liable in a final
adjudication in a civil action, or; (e) a covenant not to sue executed by
all parties involved, or; (f) an agreement for payment of damages in
installments executed by the licensee and all parties involved. For the
uninsured indigent motorist the option of losing his license or selecting one
of the alternative courses of action was a Hobson's choice. Alternatives
(a) and (b) were precluded by indigency, while (c) (d) and (e) were nearly
impossible to obtain, especially if the accident involved personal injuries. Often
times the indigent's only method of keeping his license was by the "(f) agree-
ment" for payment of damages in installments, regardless of whether he was
at fault or not. The question now arises concerning the validity of theseindemnity-type agreements that the licensees were "coerced" into signing
without any prior determination of fault in order to retain their license.
[Vol. 74
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due process hearing requirements or it will serve as a vehicle for
far reaching changes in the state's regulatory scheme.
Stephen R. Crislip
Constitutional Law-Evidence--Use of Miranda-
violative Confessions for Impeachment Purposes
Defendant Harris was charged with the sale of dangerous drugs.
After being taken into custody, he made self-incriminating statements
to the police prior to being warned of his right to appointed counsel.
These statements were conceded by the prosecution to be in violation
of the constitutional requirements set forth in Miranda v. Arizona.'
However, there was never any contention by the defendant that the
statements were coerced or involuntary.
At trial, an undercover agent testified that Harris had sold him
heroin on two separate occasions. The prosecution, however, made no
attempt to use Harris" incriminating statements in its case in chief.
Harris later took the witness stand in his own defense and denied
making the sale to the undercover agent on the first occasion. He
admitted making a sale on the second occasion but asserted that
the glassine envelope sold to the undercover agent contained only
baking powder. On cross-examination, Harris was confronted with
his illegally obtained prior contradictory statements, in which he had
admitted to obtaining narcotics on two different occasions.' The trial
court instructed the jury that these statements were to be used only
for the purpose of assessing the defendant's credibility as a witness
and not as substantive evidence of his guilt. On appeal, Harris con-
tended that the illegally obtained statements could not be used by the
state to impeach his credibility. Held: Conviction affirmed. A state-
ment taken from an accused in violation of Miranda but otherwise
384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda requires that the defendant be given
the following warnings: "He [the defendant] must be warned prior to
questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be
used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of
an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed
for him prior to any questioning .... ." Id. at 479. The Miranda decision
permits the courts to avoid determination of whether or not a defendant's
statements are voluntary by prescribing stringent procedural requirements
which must be met before the statements are admissible.
I The essence of the prior statements "read in the presence of the jury
is twofold: (1) on January 4, 1966 defendant acted as the undercover police
officer's agent in obtaining narcotics and (2) on January 2, 1966 defendant
obtained narcotics from an unknown person outside a bar and then sold
the drugs to the undercover agent .... ' People v. Harris, 298 N.Y.S.2d 245,
247 (1969).
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